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I.   INTRODUCTION 
In April 2017, the Alabama Senate voted to authorize the formation of a 
new police department.  Like other officers in the state, officers at the new 
agency would have to be certified by the Alabama Peace Officers Standards 
and Training Commission.  These new officers would be “charged with all of 
the duties and invested with all of the powers of law enforcement officers.”1  
Unlike most officers in Alabama, though, the officers at the new agency 
would not be city, county, or state employees.  Instead, they would be working 
for the Briarwood Presbyterian Church, which would be authorized under 
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1 S.B. 193 (Ala. 2017), https://legiscan.com/AL/text/SB193/id/1522071. 
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Senate Bill 193, to “appoint and employ one or more persons to act as police 
officers to protect the safety and integrity of the church and its ministries.”2 
The prospect of a private church with its own police department seems 
like a radical departure from modern practices.  The contemporary conception 
of policing, after all, views it as a primarily and foundationally governmental 
activity.3  That observation is easy to take for granted.  After all, “maintaining 
order and controlling crime are paradigmatic governmental functions.”4  That 
is certainly the role that most police agencies see themselves as fulfilling,5 
and, by and large, that is also how the public sees policing.  The uniformed 
police officers that we see driving around; that we read about in the news; and 
that we watch in reality shows like COPS, crime dramas like Law & Order, 
and comedies like The Other Guys are, without exception, government 
employees.6  This will strike most people as entirely unremarkable, and for 
good reason.  By any common conception, “the police are government 
incarnate.”7  There is, and we expect there to be, law enforcement even when 
the government does not provide or contract for basic services like water, 
sanitation services, or roads.8  Indeed, policing is symbolized by the evocative 
image of the Thin Blue Line, which represents the bulwark that defends 
civilized society from criminal anarchy.Yet the perception of law 
enforcement and crime-fighting as exclusively governmental activities is 
inaccurate as both a historical matter and a modern description.  Given the 
historical, operational, and legal overlap between public and private policing, 
the Thin Blue Line is neither particularly thin nor exclusively blue.  This is 
not a revelatory observation. Elizabeth Joh and David Sklansky, among 
others, have written about private policing,9 and there is a substantial body of 
literature about what is variously called “plural policing,” “joint policing,” or 
“third-party policing.”10  Prior efforts, however, do not fully illustrate the 
                                                 
2 S.B. 193 (Ala. 2017), https://legiscan.com/AL/text/SB193/id/1522071. 
3 U.S. PRIVATE SECURITY COUNCIL, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY: SOURCES AND 
AREAS OF CONFLICT AND STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1 (1977) (“The prevention and control 
of crime has traditionally be viewed by many citizens as a function of government provided by public law 
enforcement agencies.”). 
4 David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1168 (1999). 
5 See Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 611 (2016) (discussing the law enforcement’s self-image as the “Thin Blue Line” that 
separates society from chaos). 
6 The equation of law enforcement with government is pervasive, so much so that fictional depictions 
often use the police as a foil for private investigators who have a characteristically tense relationship with 
law enforcement.  Sherlock Holmes, Jack Reacher, Harry Dresden, and Paul Blart are defined in large part 
by their engagement in law enforcement activities despite not being government agents. 
7 David Alan Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 89 (2006). 
8 This is not to suggest that every governmental entity and subdivision provides independent policing 
services; that is certainly not the case.  Many towns and cities contract with other jurisdictions, such as 
neighboring cities or the surrounding county, to provide police services.  In very remote areas, state police 
or federal agents may be the only law enforcement officers operating in the jurisdiction. 
9 Sklansky, supra note 7, at 89; Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. 
REV. 573, 596 (2005) [hereinafter Joh, Conceptualizing]; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private 
Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 55 (2004) [hereinafter Joh, Paradox]; Sklansky, supra note 
4, at 1168. 
10 See generally Hayden P. Smith & Geoffrey Alpert, Joint Policing: Third Parties and the Use of 
Force, 12 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 136 (2011); MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, THIRD PARTY POLICING (2006); 
PLURAL POLICING: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Trevor Jones & Tim Newburn eds., 2006); ADAM 
CRAWFORD, PLURAL POLICING: THE MIXED ECONOMY OF VISIBLE PATROLS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
2017] The Blurred Blue Line  119 
distortions in the line that separates public and private policing.  This Article 
contributes to an on-going conversation about modern conceptions of 
policing.  Perhaps more importantly given the broad consensus that policing 
is in need of reform, this article explores some of the ways in which the 
blurred blue line should affect the way we think about police reform.11 
Part I describes the evolution of modern policing, tracing the emergence 
of the now-familiar police department from a mixed heritage of public and 
private efforts.  That evolution is not clearly linear; instead, American 
policing grew out of the domestic adoption of English institutions such as 
shire-reeves, constables, night watches, and thief-takers, as well as the 
creation of domestic institutions like rural slave patrols and city guards 
organized to prevent slave rebellions.  These early institutions, a mix of 
private and public entities, shared responsibility for a variety of different tasks 
that today we categorize as central to law enforcement efforts. 
Part II explores the modern practice of policing, illustrating the 
operational overlap between public and private policing.  Building on 
Elizabeth Joh’s and David Sklansky’s work on private policing, and on my 
own work on police moonlighting,12 it describes four different phenomena 
that can blur the blue line: private policing, semi-public private policing, 
semi-private public policing, and public policing. 
Part III identifies how a broader appreciation of the blurred line of public 
and private policing might affect police reform efforts.  I first refute the 
argument that the blurred blue line has no role in the reform debate.  I then 
identify three categories where the concept may prove relevant: information 
gathering, the distribution of police resources, and the regulation of policing 
itself.  Within each category, I suggest how a broader conception of 
policing—one that incorporates the spectrum of public and private 
behaviors—could inform a range of important conversations.  I offer no 
specific prescriptions; my goal with this piece is not to provide a set of 
solutions, but rather a set of possibilities. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POLICING 
Just as the need for security and safety is nothing new, the police 
function—deterring, identifying, and apprehending criminals—is hardly 
innovative.  The methods in which those functions are fulfilled, though, have 
changed significantly over time.  In the colonial era and the early days of the 
United States, what we would today identify as the police function was not 
fulfilled by governmental agencies.  “[M]ost of the institutions historically 
                                                 
(2005); MARK BUTTON, PRIVATE POLICING (2002); Rick Sarre & Tim Prenzler, The Relationship Between 
Police & Private Security: Models and Future Directions, 24 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 91 
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CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 89 (1998) (discussing “the forced recruitment of agents . . . to act on behalf and 
direction of the police to control human behavior”). 
11 U.S. PRIVATE SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 1 (“The prevention and control of crime has 
traditionally be viewed by many citizens as a function of government provided by public law enforcement 
agencies.”). 
12 Seth W. Stoughton, Moonlighting: The Private Employment of Off-Duty Officers, (forthcoming 
2017) (on file with University of Illinois Law Review). 
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responsible for law enforcement would not be recognizable to us as police.”13  
Indeed, “[t]he concept of a publicly funded entity designed to serve and 
protect society is a relatively recent historical development.”14  In this Part, I 
trace the predecessors of that development. 
First, a clarification.  Elizabeth Joh defines modern private policing as 
“the various lawful forms of organized, for-profit personnel services whose 
primary objectives include the control of crime, the protection of property and 
life, and the maintenance of order.”15  She correctly observes early law 
enforcement efforts, such as I will describe in this Part, “are not analogous to 
the private, commercial companies offering policing services today, but are 
better classified as examples of community obligations, volunteer efforts, and 
vigilantism.”16  As a result, she warns, “one should be cautious in tracing a 
continuous development of private policing from the earliest forms of 
community self-protection to the present day.”17  I happily concede her point, 
and I echo her warning.  This article, though, is focused on the blurred line 
between public and private policing.  To that end, it is worthwhile to trace the 
evolution of policing from earlier efforts, both public and private.  As this Part 
will demonstrate, public and private policing did not evolve separately.  To 
the contrary, from the earliest inception of modern policing it has been all but 
impossible to draw clear distinctions between public and private—which is to 
say, governmental and non-governmental—policing. 
A. The Complicated Origins of Modern Policing 
The government’s role in law enforcement is perhaps most identifiable in 
the form of the early English shire-reeve, a title that gives us the modern word 
“sheriff.”  The shire-reeve was a monarchical officer, selected by and 
answerable to the monarch.18  Shire-reeves were principally tax-collectors,19 
although they had the authority to assemble a group of men known as a posse 
comitatus—literally “the power of the county”20—when needed to keep the 
peace or apprehend a felon.  The shire-reeves received a portion of the taxes 
they collected as pay, creating a perverse incentive.  As a result, “many 
[reeves] exploited the power their position gave them for their own financial 
gain.”21  The existing legal system “predictably “led to abuses and made 
[reeves] rather unpopular figures.”22  The low regard in which they were held 
is observable at least as early as the 1400s in the form of Robin Hood’s 
nemesis, the corrupt and oppressive Sheriff of Nottingham (or, differently 
titled, the Reeve of Nottinghamshire). 
                                                 
13 KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA 27 (2007). 
14 JAMES F. PASTOR, THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLICE IN AMERICA 33 (2003). 
15 Joh, Paradox, supra note 9, at 55. 
16 Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 9, at 579–80. 
17 Id. at 585. 
18 PASTOR, supra note 14, at 35. 
19 WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 31. 
20 Id.; ARNOLD S. TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR: AND RATIONAL PROPOSALS TO TURN THE TIDE 
163 (2005). 
21 See generally ELIZABETH M. HALLAM, THE PLANTAGENET CHRONICLES (1995). 
22 WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 31. 
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Although the shire-reeve was the clearest example of a governmental 
agent, perhaps the most recognizable precursor of the modern law 
enforcement agency was the night watch system that originated in cities and 
larger towns in the mid-1200s.23  Every able-bodied, adult male was required 
to participate in the watch, charged with taking the occasional shift patrolling 
the town or city at night and sounding an alarm when necessary.24  There was 
no compensation, direct supervisor, or clearly identified duties.  Though 
initially a symbol of distinction, working as a watchman eventually became 
something of “a public joke”; participation may have been a public duty, but 
it was one that was often fulfilled through private transactions as citizens hired 
substitutes if they had the financial means to do so.25  “By the seventeenth 
century only those who could not hire a substitute actually assumed [the] 
onerous duties.  Once started, this practice introduced to police work those 
who were less and less qualified to do the work.”26  As a result, night 
watchmen were “unarmed, untrained, under-supervised, often unwilling, and 
frequently drunk.”27 
In England, local jurisdictions in and around London began paying 
watchmen in 1735, and most were doing so by 1785.28  At the same time, the 
watch system became more formalized, developing minimum qualifications, 
a command structure, and record-keeping requirements.29  Even then, 
“‘although [the watch] function was certainly specialized, it is not always 
clear that it was policing.  Very often, [watchmen] acted only as sentinels, 
responsible for summoning others to apprehend criminals, repel attack, or put 
out fires.’”30 
The watch system may be the clearest predecessor to modern policing, 
but even in its time it did not operate alone.  In 1797, thefts of cargo from 
boats on the Thames led a small group of distinguished citizens, including 
celebrated jurist Jeremy Bentham, to approach the West India Planters 
Committee and the West India Merchants Committees associations with a 
proposal to create a private police force.31  With the permission of the 
government, the Thames Police—officially the West India Merchants 
Company Marine Police Institute—began operations the next year.32  
Parliament passed the appropriately titled Act for the More Effectual 
Prevention of Depredations on the River Thames to support England’s first 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 DAVID R. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT: A HISTORY 3 (1981). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 31–32; see also PASTOR, supra note 14, at 36 (describing watchmen as “ill-trained, ill-
equipped groups of men [who] often lost control and violated laws and created violence in the quest to 
institute ‘law and order’”). 
28 WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 32. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 27 (quoting David H. Bayley, The Development of Modern Policing, in POLICING 
PERSPECTIVES, AN ANTHOLOGY 67 (Larry K Gaines & Gary W. Cordner eds., 199[8])). 
31 19 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: NOW FIRST COLLECTED 330–34 (John Bowring ed., 
Simpkin, Marshall, & Co., London; John Cumming, Dublin, 1843). 
32 Dick Paterson, Origins of Thames Police, THAMES POLICE MUSEUM, 
http://www.thamespolicemuseum.org.uk/h_police_1.html (last visited June 27, 2017). 
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preventative police force.33  The Thames Police did not last long, but it 
sparked a broader interest in private efforts to supplement the watch system.  
“‘By 1829[,] London had become a patchwork of public and private police 
forces.”34  A contemporary record reflects private police units operating in 
forty-five different parishes within ten miles of London.35 
It could be difficult to distinguish the public police from private 
watchmen, a confusion engendered by the widespread practice of fee-based 
policing.  According to one scholar, a police officer’s public salary could be 
more properly described as “a retaining fee”; officers’ primary income was 
claiming or sharing “any rewards for the detection and conviction of 
offenders, [whether] offered by statute, proclamation or by a private party.”36  
Supplementing into that patchwork were thief-takers—individuals who 
would, for a fee, recover stolen property, which they often obtained by buying 
it from the thief with a portion of the recovery fee37—and “felons 
associations” that raised money to fund prosecutions related to crimes 
committed within the association’s purview and which occasionally hired 
private patrols.38 
B. Policing in Colonial America 
As in England, a complicated patchwork dominated colonial America.  
Elected sheriffs and constables were the face of public law enforcement, but 
neither was particularly attractive.  “Corruption . . . was quite common, with 
sheriffs accepting bribes from suspects and prisoners, neglecting their civil 
duties, tampering with elections, and embezzling public funds.”39  Constables 
“were paid by a system of fees, and [they] tended to concentrate on the better-
paying tasks.”40  As a result, neither position was viewed as particularly 
respectable.  “[M]any people refused to serve when elected, and the authority 
of each office was commonly challenged, sometimes by violence.”41  
According to one text, “By the 1650s[,] Bostonians had become so adept at 
avoiding service that the colony’s government had to threaten citizens with 
huge fines to make them assume their obligations.”42  Citizens’ adeptness in 
dodging their obligations proved persistent.  Almost a century later, in 1743, 
seventeen Bostonians were selected to serve as constables, but only five 
entered service; ten men refused and paid a fine, while two others were 
                                                 
33 39 & 40 Geo 3 c 87. 
34 WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 32 (quoting Bayley, supra note 30, at 63). 
35 Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 9, at 584. 
36 Sir Leon Radzinowicz, Trading in Police Services: An Aspect of the Early 19th Century Police in 
England, 102 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1953).  The author goes on to describe how officers’ remuneration 
included “ordinary fees” and “fees for special services, zeal and exertion.”  Id. at 8, 11.  Additionally, 
officers sought gratuities and took private assignments from individual civilians or companies.  Id. at 18, 
20, 22. 
37 WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 32. 
38 Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 9, at 582. 
39 WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 33. 
40 Id. at 33–34. 
41 Id. at 34. 
42 JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 5.  By the mid-1700s, “many of those chosen [to serve as a watchman 
or constable] preferred to pay fines rather than suffer the duties of the office.” Id. at 7. 
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excused from service.43  Even the most conscientious sheriffs and constables 
were not engaged in what modern viewers would consider to be primarily law 
enforcement activity; their duties included serving warrants that had been 
issued by a court, but also tax collection, supervising elections, organizing 
road repair crews, and other civil functions.44 
Like their English counterparts, many large towns and cities in the 
colonial era and early United States, particularly in the northern colonies and 
states, adopted a night watch system that conscripted able-bodied, adult men 
to keep order, watch out for fires, light street lamps, and, in Boston at least, 
“cry the time of night and state of the weather.”45  And as had been the case 
in England, the watchmen were typically not paid and had no training, no set 
procedure, little to no equipment, and no real command structure.46  Citizens 
who could afford it hired substitutes to serve on the watch for them, ensuring 
that the watch was dominated by those who had no way to avoid it or no better 
opportunities elsewhere.  These semi-privatized public officials—working 
class citizens who were hired to satisfy the public service obligations of the 
more affluent—did not burnish the image of the watch; a contemporary New 
York City newspaper described them as “a parcel of idle, drinking, vigilant 
Snorers, who never quelled any nocturnal Tumult in their Lives.”47  If 
anything, this poor public perception only further ensured that those who had 
the opportunity to avoid watch service did exactly that. 
Although their duties overlapped to some extent, and although those 
duties included some aspects of modern policing, neither sheriffs, constables, 
nor the early American watch system could be clearly identified as the 
primary provider of law enforcement services.48  A description of policing in 
New York City in the mid-1780s identifies a small host of different public 
officials who all shared some law enforcement responsibilities: the mayor and 
his chief assistant, the high constable; constables and marshals who worked 
primarily on commission; and watchmen who were paid (at the time) per night 
of work.49 
In the American South, an economy heavily dependent on slavery gave 
rise to a different set of institutions that shared some of the responsibility for 
policing functions.  In the early colonial period, overseers were responsible 
for controlling the slave populations on their plantations.50  Off the 
plantations, private slave catchers and ad hoc militias hunted down runaway 
                                                 
43 JAMES F. RICHARDSON, URBAN POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1974). 
44 WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 33–34. 
45 Id. at 34–35; WILLIAM J. BOPP & DONALD O. SCHULTZ, A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 18 (1972). 
46 WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 35.  There were limited exceptions; for example, the Boston night 
watch began paying night watchmen in the early 1700s, although there is some dispute as to exactly when.  
BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 18 (reporting that Boston’s night watchmen first received 
compensation in 1712); A Brief History of the Boston, MA Police Department, BOSTON POLICE MUSEUM, 
http://bostonpolicemuseum.com/history.html (last visited June 27, 2017) [hereinafter BPD Museum] 
(putting the date at 1707). 
47 ROBERT C. WADMAN & WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON, TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: A HISTORY OF 
POLICE IN AMERICA 11 (2003). 
48 WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 35. 
49 BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 26–27. 
50 WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 36. 
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slaves, returning them for a fee.51  In 1661, the first slave code shifted 
responsibility from private slave owners to the public—meaning the white 
population—leading to the creation of more formalized militias.  These 
militias “began making regular patrols to catch runaways, prevent slave 
gatherings, search slave quarters, keep order at markets, funerals, and 
festivals, and generally intimidate the black population.”52  As with the 
sheriffs, constables, and watch, the militias were assisted by private 
individuals.  In the late 1600s, whites were first authorized and then legally 
required to assist in the recovery of runaway slaves, with the captors entitled 
to a reward.53  In the early 1700s, under the threat of a Spanish invasion, South 
Carolina bifurcated the duties of the militias and patrols: militias were 
responsible for dealing with external threats, while patrols focused on 
preventing slave revolts and dealing with runaways.54  Other southern 
governments followed suit, and slave patrols became common.55 
Although the slave patrols appear to be public entities, the reality is more 
complex.  Slave owners were averse to outside intervention, including 
government intervention intended to reinforce owners’ control over their 
slaves.  Such intervention “represented not only a usurpation of [a slave 
owner’s] authority but also a personal slight, implying that the master was not 
up to the task of controlling his slaves.”56  Different jurisdictions sought to 
address this aversion in different ways. Some rural slave patrols were paid 
from public coffers, others were made up of volunteers, while others consisted 
of unpaid conscripts.57  Regardless of their exact organization, their duties 
were largely similar—prevent insurrection by intimidating the black 
population—and they were given wide discretion to determine whether and 
how to carry out those duties in any given situation.58 
Southern anxieties about slave revolt were not limited to rural plantations.  
Early on, cities and towns’ “enforcement [was] entrusted to private 
individuals and the existing watch,” but soon the model of the rural slave 
patrol was adopted in the form of city guards.59  Unlike the night watches that 
they supplanted, the city guards were armed and uniformed from early on, 
with Charleston, South Carolina establishing what may be the nation’s first 
uniformed patrol in 1783.60  Such efforts took considerable public resources.  
By the early 1800s, the single largest item in Charleston’s city budget was 
funding for the slave patrol.61  These organized, uniformed, patrol-based 
entities came into existence more than thirty years before anything we would 
recognize today as modern police agencies. 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 37. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 37–39. 
56 Id. at 38. 
57 Id. at 40–41. 
58 Id. at 40–41. 
59 Id. at 41–42. 
60 Savannah, Georgia, followed suit in in 1796, with Richmond, Virginia, adopting uniforms in 1800.  
Id. at 42. 
61 RICHARDSON, supra note 43, at 19. 
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C. The Emergence of Modern Policing 
The first “modern” municipal police departments began to appear in the 
1830s,62 largely in response to rioting and civil unrest.63  One of the first 
metropolitan police departments in the country was funded not from the 
public coffers but by the bequest of a wealthy philanthropist who wanted 
“Philadelphia to provide more effectually than they do now for the security 
and property of the persons . . . by a competent police.”64  As that phrasing 
suggests, the police forces of the time were not universally admired.  Indeed, 
the concept of a public police force was attacked on both fiscal and 
philosophical grounds.  Fiscally, a publically funded police force would be 
more expensive than a sheriff, who worked on commission, or night 
watchmen, who were still often conscripted.  Philosophically, the creation of 
a full-time, paid police force would give a substantial amount of authority to 
the government, raising concerns about excessive power and the invasion of 
personal liberties.65  Despite these concerns, early police forces began to 
supplement, then supplant, the watch systems.66  
As American policing became more formalized, police agencies 
somewhat reluctantly added detective bureaus.  The reluctance stemmed from 
the fact that the detectives’ “specialized function carried with it the imperative 
to become involved with criminals,” and that involvement threatened to 
undermine the legitimacy of the agency’s primary duty: patrol.67  Such 
concern was well-founded.  Ostensibly charged with solving crimes, 
particularly property crimes, in practice “[t]he primary goal of the detective 
was to recover stolen property and share in the reward, not to arrest the 
thief.”68  In this way, detectives in early American policing were similar to 
their English counterparts, the thief-takers; through a system for the recovery 
of stolen property known as “compromises,” detectives “negotiated with 
thieves and offered immunity for the return of property.  The victim would 
pay the detective a ‘reward,’ which the detective would share with the thief.”69  
Many detectives worked on their own behalf or for a private security company 
in addition to their work for their public employer.70  Even when they were 
                                                 
62 Exactly which city first created a municipal police department remains contested.  Many police 
agencies date their origins on the development of a day-time watch service.  For example, Philadelphia is 
often cited as the first police agency in the United States because it created a paid, day-time watch in 1833, 
despite abandoning the effort three years later.  CHARLES R. SWANSON ET AL., CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
3 (2003). Similarly, the Boston Police Department is typically dated to 1838, when the city organized its 
day watch even though it had started paying night watchmen more than a century before.  BPD Museum, 
supra note 46.  New York City, for its part, began paying watchmen in 1658, shortly before the British 
took it, under the name of Nieu Amsterdam, from the Dutch.  BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 18–19. 
63 RICHARDSON, supra note 43, at 21. 
64 BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 35. 
65 PASTOR, supra note 14, at 36. 
66 In many cases, police forces proved to be significantly more effective than night watch systems.  
In the 1840s, for example, the twenty-two person Boston police force “captured more criminals than the 
entire rival body of over two hundred night watchmen.”  BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 37. 
67 GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 24 (1988). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 28 (describing how the “line between the public and private sectors was blurred as detectives 
went back and forth, sometimes working for both [private and public employers] simultaneously”). 
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working under the auspices of a public police agency, “much of policing took 
on the character of a contractual relationship negotiated between clients (or 
victims).  The clients sought protective, investigative or enforcement services, 
while the agents (i.e., police) supplied such services in return for a fee, reward 
or share of recovered goods.”71   
By the 1850s, police agencies were a common fixture of large cities, 
although the officers themselves were not readily identifiable: they did not 
typically wear uniforms.72  But despite the rise of the police department in its 
modern incarnation, it would be a mistake to think that law enforcement was 
exclusively or even primarily a governmental responsibility.  Municipal 
police agencies with limited jurisdiction were simply unable to accommodate 
large-scale commercial entities operating on an interstate or national scale, 
such as railroads, banks, and mining companies.73  This was particularly true 
in the West and Midwest, which had relatively few public police officers.74  
Without a strong federal police presence, private organizations stepped in to 
fill the gap.  In 1850, as localities across the country continued to establish 
their own police agencies, Allan Pinkerton formed the Pinkerton National 
Detective Agency.75  Pinkerton agents engaged in sting operations, solved 
crimes, and hunted down criminals,76 all of which are likely to strike the 
modern reader as more within the purview of public police than private 
security.77 
By the 1880s, all of the major cities in the United States had created 
municipal police agencies, and states soon followed suit.  Following Texas’s 
early 1870 example, other southwestern states began creating state police 
agencies at the turn of the century.78  State police continued to expand over 
the next few decades, with the momentum eventually shifting from general 
service police agencies to dedicated highway patrols during the Great 
Depression.79  Throughout this period, private security was in decline as states 
and local governments increased their expenditures on law enforcement, 
                                                 
71 PASTOR, supra note 14, at 37. 
72 BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 45, at 39.  There was both public and internal controversy about 
police uniforms.  Public critics condemned uniforms as imitative of royal livery, while many officers feared 
that wearing a uniform would only invite attack.  Id. at 39–40 (describing the sentiment among officers 
“that the job was dangerous enough without advertising that one was an officer”); see also JOHNSON, supra 
note 25, at 25.  The officers may have had a point.  In in 1700s, watchmen in Charleston, South Carolina, 
had become so reviled that sailors “began to purposefully target the watchmen on their rounds, sometimes 
beating them severely.”  WADMAN & ALLISON, supra note 47, at 12.  As a result, it took decades before 
uniforms were accepted.  Three of the largest police agencies—Boston, New York, and Chicago—adopted 
uniforms in 1858, 1860, and 1861, respectively.  JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 29. 
Notably, officers began carrying firearms as a matter of course at about the same time, although many 
police agencies still prohibited them as a matter of official policy.  Id. at 30. When cities began to authorize 
officers to carry firearms, it “only recognized what was becoming standard.”  Id. 
73 PASTOR, supra note 14, at 38. 
74 Id. 
75 Id.  Although the Pinkerton National Detective Agency was not the first private security company 
in the United States, it was by far the largest and most successful.  SWANSON ET AL., supra note 62, at 4. 
76 MARX, supra note 67, at 28–29. 
77 Then, as now, the proper balance of public and private policing was a matter of debate, with private 
security forces criticized as tools of the wealthy. PASTOR, supra note 14, at 38–39. 
78 H. KENNETH BECHTEL, STATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
35–39 (1995). 
79 Id. at 42–44. 
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encouraged by private industry and large companies that preferred to shift the 
costs of security from their account books to the public coffers.80  The decline 
of private policing, however, was temporary.  The next Part addresses the 
contemporary practices that continue to blur the line between public and 
private policing. 
III.  THE BLURRING OF THE BLUE LINE 
The prior Part described the complicated and inconsistent evolution of 
public and private efforts that gave rise to modern policing, demonstrating 
both the muddled heritage and the fact that there has likely never been a point 
in time at which public and private policing could be clearly distinguished.  
As leading scholars have pointed out, private policing efforts are difficult to 
casually conceptualize.  David Sklansky, for example, has argued that private 
policing is functionally indistinguishable from both the public police and from 
the public more generally.81  Elizabeth Joh has argued that “traditional legal 
scholarship has demonstrated too shallow an understanding of private 
policing in action,” which she attributes to the assumption “that private 
policing is a monolithic entity.”82  Building on Elizabeth Joh’s and David 
Sklansky’s work on private policing, this Part turns to the modern era by 
describing four different phenomena: private policing, semi-public private 
policing, semi-private public policing, and public policing.83  Each, it seems, 
has the potential, if not the tendency, to blur the line that separates—or 
doesn’t—public and private policing. 
My objective in this Part is to demonstrate the substantial overlap that 
exists in private and public policing as they are currently practiced.  In so 
doing, I do not mean to suggest that any interstices between the two are 
inconsequential, nor do I intend to argue that the points of comparison are 
universally applicable.  Indeed, my goal is to offer some support for 
Sklansky’s argument: as it is practiced, public and private policing can come 
close to being functionally indistinguishable.84  Indeed, the line is blurred in 
both directions to an extent that has not been fully appreciated.  In the next 
Part, I address the potential implications of that observation on police reform 
efforts. 
A. Private Policing 
Today, the vast majority of police officers are employed at the state and 
local level.  According to the most recent data available, more than 15,000 
state and local general-purpose law enforcement agencies employ almost 
                                                 
80 PASTOR, supra note 14, at 39. 
81 Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1270–75. 
82 Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 9, at 596. 
83 Elizabeth Joh has persuasively argued that it is a mistake to view private policing as monolithic, as 
there are at least five dimensions of variation in (goals, resources, legal powers, jurisdiction, and 
organizational location) and four distinct types of private policing (protective policing, intelligence 
policing, publically contracted policing, and corporate policing).  Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 9, at 
596.  This valuable taxonomy informs, but cannot structure, my analysis here. 
84 Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1270–75. 
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725,000 full-time officers.85  Additionally, more than 1,700 special 
jurisdiction agencies—agencies with either a special geographic jurisdiction, 
such as a university or public transportation system, or with limited 
enforcement responsibilities such as alcohol control agencies—employ an 
additional 57,000 full-time officers.86  The 638 constables and marshals’ 
agencies left in the country employ a total of about 3,500 full-time officers.87  
In total, there are approximately 780,000 full-time, sworn law enforcement 
officers working for state or local governments in the United States.  The ratio 
of 252 officers per 100,000 people means that there is one state or local officer 
for roughly every 400 people (one officer for every 300 adults) in the 
population.88 
What about the private security industry?  Although precise numbers are 
difficult to come by,89 one thing is certain: there are more—probably many 
more—individuals working in private security than in public policing.90  As 
of 2015, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that there were almost 1.1 
million private security guards responsible for “guard[ing], patrol[ing] or 
monitor[ing] premises.”91  The National Association of Security Companies 
agrees, estimating that, in 2006, “between 11,000 and 15,000 private security 
companies employ[ed] more than 1 million guards.”92  The broader private 
security industry, which includes individuals who conduct background 
investigations, provide armored transport services, offer personal protection, 
manage correctional facilities, and perform security-related tasks other than 
those that fall under the general classification of “patrol,” is even larger.93  
                                                 
85 BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., NCJ 233982, CENSUS OF 




88 LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE & SEX COMPOSITION: 2010, 
at 2 tbl.1 (May 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf.  (There are an 
additional 120,000 full-time law enforcement officers employed by the federal government, spread over 
73 different law enforcement agencies.  Of that number, over a third (37.3%) engage in “criminal 
investigation and enforcement duties,” while almost a quarter (23.4%) perform police response and patrol.  
The remainder works in immigration or customs inspection (15.3%), corrections (14.2%), security and 
protection (5.1%), and court operations (4.7%).)  REAVES, supra note 85, at 1. (Including federal officers, 
there are 900,000 full-time, sworn officers in the United States, or one officer for about every 300 adults 
in the population.) 
89 This is true in part because there is no uniform definition about what constitutes “private security.”  
For a useful discussion of the conceptual difficulties that complicate attempts to define that term, see 
Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning, Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications, 3 CRIME 
& JUST. 193, 195–98 (1981). 
90 Joh, supra note 9, at 1; Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1175. 
91 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND 
WAGES: 33-9032 SECURITY GUARDS (May 2015), http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes339032.htm; 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK: SECURITY 
GUARDS AND GAMING SURVEILLANCE OFFICERS (2016–17 ed.), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-
service/security-guards.htm. 
92 KEVIN STROM ET AL., DOCUMENT NO. 232781, THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY: A REVIEW OF 
THE DEFINITIONS, AVAILABLE DATA SOURCES, AND PATHS MOVING FORWARD 4-8 (Dec. 2010), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/ 
grants/232781.pdf. 
93 STROM ET AL., supra note 92, at 4-6.  One study estimates the number of “full-time security workers 
to be between 1.9 and 2.1 million.”  Press Release, ASIS Int’l, Groundbreaking Study Finds U.S. Security 
Industry to be $350 Billion Market (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.asisonline.org/News/Press-Room/Press-
Releases/2013/Pages/Groundbreaking-Study-Finds-U.S.-Security-Industry-to-be-$350-Billion-
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Further, private security as an industry is growing faster than public policing.  
The Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that the ten-year period from 2014 to 
2024 will see 4% growth in public policing, but 7% growth in the private 
security industry.94  This follows ten-year predictions from 2012 to 2022 of 
5% and 12%, respectively.95  Historically, the thirty-year period from 1980 to 
2010 saw an 80% growth in contract security firms.96  Local police 
departments, on the other hand, saw only a 34% increase in officers in the 
twenty-six years between 1987 and 2013.97  Further, the total number and rate 
of growth does not include individuals who work in a primarily security 
capacity for non-security businesses, such as loss prevention employees 
working for retail stores, or the wide range of employees who have some 
security-related responsibilities, even if their primary duties are unrelated to 
security.98   
Regardless of whether they are employed by a traditional security 
company or some other enterprise, private employees conduct a range of what 
we would otherwise identify as law enforcement activities.  The comparison 
can be a point of pride for security personnel and a selling point for their 
employers.  Elizabeth Joh’s seminal article on the private security industry 
opens with a quote from a security guard describing his agency as “very 
policelike.”99  That description captures the broad involvement of private 
security personnel in patrol, investigations, and surveillance, as well as their 
authority to stop, search, and arrest.  Uniformed security guards engage in 
patrol on behalf of private businesses, community centers, and 
neighborhoods.  In many gated communities, security guards physically 
control space100 by screening vehicles and pedestrians at entry checkpoints 
                                                 
Market.aspx [hereinafter Groundbreaking Study].  I have intentionally left unmentioned the private 
security industry’s “hardware security” component, which manufactures, installs, and monitors alarm 
systems.  Although closely related to law enforcement, this function may be seen as distinct from the 
modern conception of policing.  There are some potential parallels, though: law enforcement agencies have 
been instrumental in installing and monitoring emergency call boxes in some public spaces; these alarms 
are a familiar sight on many university campuses. 
94 Compare BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK 
HANDBOOK, POLICE AND DETECTIVES (2016–17 ed.), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/police-
and-detectives.htm#tab-6 (visited Feb. 21, 2017), with id., SECURITY GUARDS & GAMING SURVEILLANCE 
OFFICERS, http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/security-guards.htm#tab-6 (last visited June 27, 
2017).  Different facets of the private security industry may grow even faster.  A study by ASIS Int’l, a 
professional organization for the security industry, and the Institute of Finance and Management, a 
professional organization for financial controllers, estimated that private investigations would see 21% 
growth and information technology security would see 22% through 2020.  Groundbreaking Study, supra 
note 93. 
95 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 
POLICE AND DETECTIVES (2014–15 ed.), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/police-and-
detectives.htm (Dec. 19, 2013); id., SECURITY GUARDS & GAMING SURVEILLANCE OFFICERS, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/security-guards.htm. 
96 STROM ET AL., supra note 92, at 4-3. 
97 REAVES, supra note 85, at 1. 
98 Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1175 (listing “store clerks, insurance adjustors, and amusement park 
attendants” as non-security employees who nevertheless have some security-related responsibilities). 
99 Joh, Paradox, supra note 9, at 49 (quoting Bud Hazelkorn, Making Crime Pay, S.F. CHRON. MAG., 
Aug. 17, 2003, at 14, 17). 
100 Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2199 (2014) 
(“Policing is, to a significant extent, the exercise of control over space.”); see also STEVE HERBERT, 
POLICING SPACE: TERRITORIALITY AND THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–11, 21–23 (1997). 
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that only residents and duly designated guests are permitted to pass.101  They 
respond to complaints and alarms, from the mall security officers called to 
deal with an obnoxious patron in the food court to mobile security officers 
who respond to residential burglar alarms.  With both a preventative and 
responsive aspect, private security patrol closely parallels the public police 
patrol function. 
Patrol is the “mainstay of police work,”102 but policing also includes an 
investigative component; police agencies are expected to investigate and 
solve crimes so they can apprehend offenders and support successful 
prosecutions.103  Those investigations may include surveillance, either 
targeted surveillance that tracks a subject suspected of wrong-doing104 or 
drag-net surveillance that captures a range of individuals in an attempt to 
ferret out wrong-doing that has not yet been identified.105  Just as private 
parties parallel the public police’s patrol function, so too do they engage in 
similar investigative behaviors.  “Private detectives increasingly are hired not 
only to watch for shoplifters, but also to investigate and not infrequently to 
spy on, everyone from insurance claimants and litigation opponents to 
employees, business partners, and even prospective neighbors.”106   
In addition to targeted surveillance, private security efforts include 
pervasive surveillance of public or private space.  Such surveillance is not 
intended to gather information about a particular person, but rather to observe 
the behaviors of a group of people (whoever happens to be in camera range) 
so that wrongdoers can be identified in real time or after the fact.  Casino 
surveillance is perhaps the most obvious example of privately administered 
pervasive surveillance.  In Nevada, for example, the Gaming Commission 
requires licensed casinos that operate at least three gaming tables to have the 
capacity to “monitor and record: (a) each table game area with sufficient 
clarity to identify patrons and dealers; and (b) each table game surface, with 
sufficient coverage and clarity to simultaneously view the table bank and 
determine the configuration of wagers, card values, and game outcomes.”107  
According to a long-time casino security engineer, a large casino like the 
                                                 
101 EDWARD JAMES BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COMMUNITIES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (1997) (estimating that over 20,000 gated communities existed in the United 
States as of 1997). 
102 ERIC J. FRITSCH ET AL., POLICE PATROL ALLOCATION AND DEPLOYMENT 17 (2008); see also Seth 
W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 879–80 (2014). 
103 Indeed, this expectation is so persistent that the failure to do so is considered newsworthy.  Martin 
Kaste, Open Cases: Why One-Third of Murders In America Go Unresolved, NPR (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:04 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/30/395069137/open-cases-why-one-third-of-murders-in-america-go-
unresolved; Jace Larson, New Harris County Numbers Show Many Unsolved Crimes, CLICK2HOUSTON 
(May 18, 2015), http://www.click2houston.com/news/investigates/new-harris-county-numbers-show-
many-unsolved-crimes/33082726; Lyndsay Winkley, Murders Mostly Solved, Not Minor Crimes, SAN 
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Apr. 11, 2015, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2015/apr/11/police-clearance-rates-
murders-fbi-stats/. 
104 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
105 For example, the New York Police Department’s surreptitious surveillance of Muslim 
communities in New Jersey.  Adam Goldman, Tape Surfaces of Caller Outing NYPD Spying in NJ, ABC 
EYEWITNESS NEWS 11 (July 25, 2012), http://abc11.com/archive/8748471/. 
106 Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1176. 
107 NEVADA GAMING COMM’N, SURVEILLANCE STANDARDS FOR NONRESTRICTED LICENSES, 
SURVEILLANCE STANDARD 2(1) (2005), 
http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=2944.  
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Bellagio may have more than 2,000 active cameras.108  While this is a rather 
extreme example, and one largely directed at private space, private 
surveillance in more public areas is a fact of modern life: outward facing 
security cameras are a common feature of parking lots, gas pumps, ATMs, 
apartment building entrances, urban storefronts, and so on. 
Not only do private actors share many of the duties of their public 
counterparts, they often share some of the same legal powers.  At common 
law, private citizens had the power to arrest—the proverbial “citizen’s 
arrest”—but it was limited.  Like public officials, private citizens could arrest 
for felonies committed outside of their presence, but could only arrest for 
misdemeanors and breaches of the peace committed in their presence.109  If 
the person arrested for the misdemeanor was not the perpetrator of the crime, 
or if no felony had actually been committed, a public officer was immune 
from civil and criminal liability so long as they had a good faith belief 
amounting to probable cause at the time of the arrest.  But a private citizen 
had no such protection; even with a good-faith, probable cause belief that the 
perpetrator committed a crime, civilians remained potentially liable for a 
range of intentional torts and their criminal analogues.110  Private security 
guards, on the other hand, have less to worry about. 
The law in many jurisdictions gives more flexibility to private businesses 
and their employees than it does to citizens.  Statutes that codify the common-
law doctrine known as “shopkeeper’s privilege” or “merchant’s privilege,” 
for example, provide a probable cause defense for business owners and 
employees who arrest someone for larceny.111  Further, merchants may be 
explicitly authorized to use force to effectuate the arrest or protect their 
property in a way that private citizens are not.112  Such statutes may provide 
“absolute immunity from civil liability for intentional torts . . . which may 
occur during the apprehension and detention of a customer suspected for 
shoplifting.”113  And while a merchant and the merchant’s agents face less 
civil or criminal liability than a private individual would, the perpetrator of 
the crime may face more; in some states, resisting a merchant or private 
security guard’s attempt to arrest carries a separate criminal penalty in much 
the same way that it is a crime to resist a police officer’s attempt to arrest.114 
                                                 
108 Jon Brodkin, Casino Insider Tells (Almost) all About Security, NETWORKWORLD (Mar. 7, 2008, 
12:00 AM), http://www.networkworld.com/ 
article/2284208/software/casino-insider-tells--almost--all-about-security.html. 
109 Note, The Law of Citizen’s Arrest, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 502, 504–05 (1965) [hereinafter Citizen’s 
Arrest]; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1924). 
110 Citizen’s Arrest, supra note 109, at 511.  Some states have provided substantive protections by 
immunizing private citizens who have some quantum of proof—probable cause or reasonable cause are 
the two most common—supporting their actions.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE 
SERV. (NCJRS), NCJRS 146908, SCOPE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY OF PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL apps. 
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https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/146908NCJR 
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111 Amanda G. Main, Note, Racial Profiling in Places of Public Accommodation: Theories of 
Recovery and Relief, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 289, 293–94 (2000). 
112 Id. at 295. 
113 ALAN KAMINSKY, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO PREMISES SECURITY LITIGATION 82 (2008). 
114 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.015(6) (“An individual who . . . resists the reasonable effort of 
a . . . merchant [or] merchant’s employee . . . commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.”). 
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Private security guards acting on behalf of their employers are not just 
given more protection than private citizens, they may also be given more 
authority.  In some states, private security guards are explicitly equated to 
public police.  In South Carolina, for example, an individual “hired or 
employed to provide security services on a specific property is granted the 
authority and arrest power given to sheriff’s deputies” while on that property, 
so long as the security guard is “registered or licensed.”115  Further blurring 
the line between public and private policing, it is the South Carolina State 
Law Enforcement Division that does the registering and licensing for security 
guards in the state, as well as playing a central role in the regulation of private 
security and investigations businesses and employees.116 
The equation of private actors with public officials also plays prominently 
in the history of bounty hunting.  The authority for bounty hunting dates from 
1873, when the Supreme Court held that, under the common law, a bondsman 
has “dominion” over a defendant whose bond he had paid.117  That control, 
the Court held, “is a continuance of the original imprisonment.”118  By virtue 
of the private contract, the private bondsman, in essence, stands in the shoes 
of the public law enforcement official who had originally imprisoned the 
defendant: 
 
Whenever [the bondsmen] choose to do so, they may seize [the 
defendant] and deliver him up in their discharge; and if that cannot 
be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be done.  They 
may exercise their rights in person or by agent.  They may pursue him 
into another State; may arrest him on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, 
may break and enter his house for that purpose.  The seizure is not 
made by virtue of new process.  None is needed.  It is likened to the 
rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner.119 
 
Given that authority, it should be no surprise that private parties engage 
in the rather specialized function of fugitive apprehension.  According to one 
source, private “[b]ounty hunters claim to catch 31,500 bail jumpers per year, 
about 90 percent of people who jump bail in the United States.”120 
                                                 
115 S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-18-110 (2000).  For a more thorough, if slightly outdated, discussion of 
statutes and common law governing private security, see NCJRS, SCOPE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY, supra 
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Indeed, private actors may well have more authority than public 
officers.121  They are not regulated by the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments 
or the state analogues that restrict police actions, nor are they subject to 
federal statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 or judicial remedies 
like the exclusionary rule.  Because they are private actors, “[p]rivate police 
have been held exempt from the Fourth Amendment and the Miranda rules—
as well as from restrictions on entrapment and statutory disclosure 
requirements.”122  As a result, private actors can act when public officers 
cannot, without the quanta of proof that would be required to support police 
action and without fear of the same remedial mechanisms.  In 2013, for 
example, an appellate court in North Carolina held that a private security 
guard hired by a Homeowners’ Association to patrol a private neighborhood 
was not a state actor and thus was permitted to conduct a traffic stop without 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.123 
Though the authority wielded by public police officers and private 
security actors can differ in meaningful ways, it is not always easy for the 
casual observer to determine who is whom.  Private security guards often 
wear uniforms reminiscent of police uniforms, and their marked patrol 
vehicles may be emblazoned with phrases indicative of governmental service, 
such as “Metro Public Safety.”124  They may be permitted or required to wear 
or carry badges and credentials that only a close read will identify as 
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Regardless, it appears that the private security officer in Weaver was not expected to provide the same 
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belonging to a private actor.125  And sometimes even knowing that a 
uniformed officer is paid by a private security agency, rather than a public 
police department, won’t sufficiently distinguish between private and public 
policing efforts. 
B. Semi-Public Private Policing 
Complicating the task of cleanly distinguishing between public and 
private security is the close working relationship that can exist between the 
two.  This is a relatively recent phenomenon in the United States.  
“Historically, a patronizing, if not suspicious and antagonistic, attitude on the 
part of public police toward their private counterparts seem[s] to have been 
the dominant theme.”126  As of 1972, “no city . . . contracted directly with a 
private firm for all police services, and less than 1 percent of the cities 
surveyed dealt with private firms for subservice functions like crime labs.”127  
In 1977, the United States Private Security Advisory Council, which advised 
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration at the Department of Justice, 
identified several major barriers between private and public policing, which 
they “ranked [in] order of pervasiveness and intensity[:]  
 
• lack of mutual respect[;] 
• lack of communication[;] 
• lack of cooperation[;] 
• lack of law enforcement knowledge of private  
 security[;] 
• perceived competition[;] 
• lack of standards [for cooperation; and] 
• perceived corruption.”128 
 
Perhaps the most significant barrier, however, was the belief that public 
policing was about protecting public concerns, while private security efforts 
were directed exclusively at private concerns.129  “[P]rivate security,” it was 
thought, “ought to stay well away from the realm of investigation and public 
service, and to take a purely passive and preventative role.”130   
Times have changed.  Although the status differential and other factors 
undoubtedly remain an area of conflict between public police and private 
security agencies, there appears to be a higher degree of cooperation than in 
earlier eras.  In 2004, the International Association of Chiefs of Police issued 
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a summit report urging laws of “the major law enforcement and private 
security organizations [to] make a formal commitment to cooperation.”131  
Public-private partnerships were to be viewed as “a preferred tool to address 
terrorism, public disorder, and crime.”132  Further, public entities were more 
willing to make use of private security agencies.  By the late 1990s, it was 
estimated that about 45% of local government entities were hiring private 
companies to provide at least some security services.133  In all likelihood, that 
number has only increased.  Government agencies employ the third largest 
number of private security employees, after only manufacturing firms and 
retail businesses, “and the expenditures for such services run in the 
multibillion dollar range.”134 
What exactly are those private security agencies doing for their public 
employers for that multibillion dollar payoff?  The short answer is, “Just about 
everything.”  Private security guards have been used to supplement traditional 
public policing by, for example, providing static, preventative security.  
Today, thousands of federal buildings around the country are protected by 
some 15,000 private security guards contracted by the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service.135  Local governments, 
meanwhile, contract with private security agencies to guard “public buildings, 
sports arenas, schools, public housing projects, convention centers, courts, 
airports, and other public facilities.136  Local governments also fund private 
security efforts.  In Washington, D.C., the Private Security Camera Incentive 
Program provides “a rebate for residents, businesses, nonprofits, and religious 
institutions to purchase and install security camera systems on [the exterior 
of] their property and register them with the Metropolitan Police 
Department.”137  The stated purpose of the program is “to help deter crime 
and assist law enforcement with investigations.”138  As of October 2016, the 
program has issued more than 900 rebates, funding the installation of more 
than 2500 private security cameras.139 
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Security personnel and private security efforts are not purely passive; 
private policing can also be responsive.140  For example, local governments 
contract with private security agencies to provide many different aspects of 
the patrol function previously fulfilled by public police, including directing 
traffic when necessary.141  Government entities might also use private 
contractors to respond to some calls for service.  Burglar alarms are a perfect 
example: when an alarm accurately identifies a burglary in progress, it may 
be vastly preferable to have a police officer—with a potentially faster 
response time and the benefit of more training, better equipment, and the 
availability of backup—respond to the scene.  Unfortunately, alarms are 
rarely accurate; various studies have found that false positives account for up 
to 95% of all alarms.142  And there can be lots of alarms; “alarm responses 
account for 10 percent to 30 percent of all calls for police service.”143  A 
Department of Justice report estimated in 1998 that responding to alarms cost 
public law enforcement agencies $1.5 billion144 (more than $2.2 billion in 
2016 terms145).  To preserve scarce resources, many police agencies have 
stopped responding to non-verified alarms, meaning alarms that are triggered 
but have not been verified by a video or auditory feed or a live complainant 
such as a resident or security guard.146  And when public police pull out, 
“private police can contribute . . . by patrolling and by handling certain 
service functions, such as alarm response.”147 
Beyond the relatively limited context of burglary alarms, private security 
personnel also engage in proactive policing by patrolling assigned beats.148  
Although the paradigmatic deployment of private security patrols involves 
personnel reporting incidents to sworn, public officers,149 private security 
employees engage in what many modern viewers would consider to be more 
invasive law enforcement activities.  Parking enforcement is perhaps the least 
objectionable aspect of proactive, invasive policing,150 but it may also be true 
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that private police perform “more stops, searches, and interrogations than is 
often imagined.”151 
On some occasions, semi-public private policing blurs the line even 
further, as when political subdivisions hire private security companies to be 
the primary provider of policing services.152  Kalamazoo, Michigan, for 
example, contracted with the private security company Charles Services “for 
street patrol and traffic control.”153  Under that arrangement, “private 
personnel were sworn in as deputy sheriffs in order to ensure compliance to 
the law, but the personnel were paid by the hour so that they could be released 
during slow periods and provided in larger force during peak periods.”154  
Hiring a private firm as the primary provider of policing services isn’t 
common, but Kalamazoo isn’t unique.  At least seven other jurisdictions have 
contracted with private security agencies to provide policing services, 
including two—Indian Springs, Florida, and Buffalo Creek, West Virginia—
that did so for over five years.155  
C. Semi-Private Public Policing 
Just as private security employees can operate as semi-public entities, 
public police can be semi-privatized.  Examples can be found in special 
jurisdiction agencies, special appointments, and the widespread practice of 
private employers hiring off-duty officers to engage in law enforcement or 
security services. 
Special jurisdiction agencies are police organizations that serve either a 
special geographic jurisdiction that does not align with political 
subdivisions—university or transit police, for example—or engage in 
specialized enforcement activities, such as the Enforcement Division of 
Nevada’s Gaming Control Board.156  As of 2008, the last year for which data 
were available, there were more 1,700 special jurisdiction agencies that 
employed just under 57,000 full-time, sworn officers.157  Many of these, 
perhaps most, do little to blur the line between public and private policing.158  
But some do.  The Federal Reserve System, a somewhat unique public/private 
entity, has its own law enforcement agency, the United States Federal Reserve 
Police.159  Officers may be “designated or authorized by the [Federal Reserve 
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Board] or a reserve bank,” and are authorized to carry firearms, make arrests, 
and access law enforcement information.160  Another example, and one less 
connected to government entities, can be found in private universities’ police 
departments.  Campus police officers at Yale, for example, “wear New Haven 
Police Department badges and are invested with their powers of arrest through 
the City of New Haven,” even though “the Yale Police Department and New 
Haven Police Department are in fact two separate entities.”161  The blurring 
of public and private policing can be even more dramatic.  Headquartered in 
Memphis, Tennessee, the FedEx Corporation is a publicly traded 
multinational business organization with annual revenue of more than $50 
billion in 2016.162  It doesn’t just maintain a massive fleet of air carriers that 
service more than 350 airports, it also maintains a private police force.  
Because Tennessee law allows for the creation of “transportation security 
officers”163 who have “all of the powers of a peace officer,”164 FedEx employs 
a (relatively small) number of officers can who can make arrests, apply for 
warrants, initiate pursuits, carry weapons, and participate in a Regional Joint 
Terrorism Task Force.165   
Tennessee is not the only state that allows private entities to establish 
police forces.  In Arizona, a private railroad company can, on its own, 
designate “railroad police,” who “aid and supplement . . . law enforcement 
agencies . . . in the protection of railroad property and the protection of the 
persons and property of railroad passengers and employees.”166  Other states 
blur the line between public and private policing even more.  In Virginia, a 
private corporation or the private owner of “any place within the 
Commonwealth” can ask a circuit court judge to appoint a “special 
conservator of the peace.”167  A special conservator can be designated a “law-
enforcement officer” and may identify themselves as “police” on uniform or 
badge, including a badge that bears the state seal.168  Special conservators can 
serve up to a four-year term, and in that time “have all the powers, functions, 
duties, responsibilities and authority” of a police officer, at least within “such 
geographical confines as the court may deem appropriate . . . within the 
confines of the county, city or town where the corporate applicant is 
located.”169  Courts may, but need not, “limit the use of flashing lights and 
sirens on personal vehicles used by the conservator in the performance of his 
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duties.”170  A special conservator must register with the Department of 
Criminal Justice Services and may have to go through basic police training, 
although exemptions are permissible.171  There are, however, benefits to going 
through a police academy.  A special conservator “who has completed the 
minimum training standards established by the Department of Criminal 
Justice Services . . . has the authority to [e]ffect arrests, using up to the same 
amount of force as would be allowed to a law-enforcement officer employed 
by the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions when making a 
lawful arrest.”172  Special conservators of the peace are public officers who 
may be requested by a private corporation or property owner, but the special 
conservator is a public officer and not (necessarily) an employee of the 
requesting party. Special Conservators are, in essence, privately requested 
police officers without an agency; they work outside both the normal market 
controls of a private security company and the normal political controls of a 
local police officer.   
Not every private entity can create their own police force, nor do most of 
them need to do so.  Private interests can leverage public policing by shifting 
the costs of security from their own expenditure to the public coffers.  
According to a review of Walmart stores in the Tampa area, for example, local 
police agencies “logged nearly 16,800 calls” over the course of a year, or “two 
calls an hour, every hour, every day.”173  One officer described the situation 
this way: “We are, as a department, at the mercy of what they [Walmart] want 
to do.”174  According to retail analyst Burt Flickinger, “Law enforcement 
becomes in effect a taxpayer-paid private security source for Walmart.”175 
Private industry does not always rely on the largess of public police; 
various investigative efforts may be privately funded.  In the early 1980s, the 
National Automobile Theft Bureau, a not-for-profit organization “dedicated 
exclusively to fighting insurance fraud and crime,”176  provided personnel and 
funding for a joint operation with the Tennessee Department of Revenue and 
the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department that, under the supervision of 
a prosecutor, used extensive undercover investigations to target vehicle theft 
in eastern Tennessee.177  More recently, licensed taxis in Los Angeles pay a 
$30 monthly fee to fund police sting operations directed at ferreting out 
unlicensed taxis since 2006.178  In the modern era of ride-sharing apps like 
Uber and Lyft, this funding has been used to identify drivers who illegally 
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accept cash payment (instead of demanding payment through the app, as 
required).179  
Businesses can acquire police services even more directly by hiring 
uniformed officers to provide law enforcement services while they’re off-
duty, a practice known as “moonlighting.”180  According to a recent survey of 
more than 160 police agencies that collectively employ over 143,000 full-
time, sworn officers—almost a fifth of all non-federal officers in the 
country—the vast majority of police agencies permit officers to engage in 
moonlighting.181  And officers take advantage of that opportunity more 
frequently than one might expect: the agencies that track the relevant data 
reported that 42.63% of their full-time, sworn employees worked in a law 
enforcement capacity for a private employer.182  To the casual observer, it can 
be difficult or impossible to distinguish between moonlighting and public 
policing, as off-duty officers typically wear the same uniform and provide the 
same wide range of services that on-duty officers might otherwise provide.  
The single most important difference—how an officer is being 
compensated—is something that observers simply are not privy to. 
 
[U]niformed officers may be paid for providing security at a night 
club or bar or for directing traffic outside of a church or synagogue.  
Officers may also receive free or discounted rent at an apartment 
complex (so-called “courtesy officers”) in exchange for parking their 
marked police vehicle in a visible spot or for responding, when 
off-duty, to non-emergency calls like noise complaints.  Officers may 
be compensated directly by the private entity that hires them, or the 
employer may pay the city or agency so the officer’s compensation is 
channeled through the public payroll system.  Officers may also 
receive collateral benefits from private employers, such as employee 
discounts and earlier-than-public access to information and 
products.183 
 
The manner in which officers engage in moonlighting can further blur the 
line.  Some agencies employ in-house coordinators to facilitate officers’ off-
duty employment; private employers who want to hire off-duty officers 
approach the agency itself, which then makes the job available to officers.  
Other agencies take a more hands-off approach, leaving it to private 
employers and individual officers to find each other and work out the details 
of a moonlighting job, subject only to agency approval.  This has created 
something of a private market for off-duty officers.  Phoenix-based security 
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firm Law Enforcement Specialists, for example, takes a traditional approach 
to providing security personnel, but offers off-duty officers instead of regular 
security guards.184  The technology start-up CopsForHire takes a different 
tack, having establishing a “platform for the on-demand marketplace of cops 
working off-duty.”185  Their online marketplace follows the example of Uber, 
the popular ride-sharing app, by connecting private employers with local 
officers who would be interested in working off-duty.  The appeal of this 
approach isn’t limited to officers who independently seek their own 
moonlighting opportunities; police agencies can also adopt the CopsForHire 
platform for internal use, essentially hiring CopsForHire to play a 
coordinating role.186 
The existence of special jurisdiction police agencies, the special 
appointment of officers, and the widespread practice of moonlighting all have 
the potential to partially privatize public policing. 
D. Public Policing 
In contrast with the specialized agencies, officers, and duties discussed in 
the previous section, one might think that an on-duty officer at a municipal 
public agency is a clear and definitive example of purely public policing.  
Sometimes that may be the case.  But certain investigative techniques, 
funding and equipment, and the reliance on private parties to assist with police 
investigations can all blur the line between public and private policing. 
On at least some occasions, officers act in an official capacity outside of 
the jurisdiction in which they have lawful authority.  The International Liaison 
Program implemented by the New York Police Department, for example, has 
stationed Intelligence Officers in 13 cities far outside of the geographic 
boundaries of New York.  “The world-wide presence allows NYPD officers 
at the scene of a terrorist attack to provide information to the NYPD’s 
counterterrorism command structure.”187  When that is the case, officers may 
be effectively limited to doing no more than what any “ordinary” individual 
might do.  In essence, officers may fulfill their public position even without 
the mantle of state authority. 
Outside the relatively confined context of extrajudicial action, several 
common investigative tactics depend on obscuring the line separating public 
and private action, and for good reason; officers simply would not be effective 
if they operated in a way that continually advertised their official affiliation.  
But the very reason that these tactics are effective also creates the potential 
for them to blur the line between public and private action.  In plainclothes 
operations, for example, officers engage in surveillance or proactive patrol 
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while wearing civilian attire rather than police uniforms.  The objective is to 
observe people without advertising officers’ official identities until it 
becomes advantageous to do so; e.g., when initiating an investigative 
detention.  The difficulty of identifying officers in these circumstances has 
become an issue in several high profile incidents, including the shootings of 
Amadou Diallo and Sean Bell.188  Undercover operations blur the line of 
public and private policing even more, as officers assume the role of a civilian.  
There are different degrees of “cover” under which an officer can operate.  At 
one end of the spectrum is superficial cover, as with officers engaged in 
prostitution stings or reverse-stings.189  Other operations require modest 
preparation, as with officers who create misleading personal accounts to 
investigate child pornography.190  At the far end of the spectrum is 
sophisticated cover identities that require what is known as “backstopping,” 
the creation of fictitious information to support a cover identity.191  The 
paradigmatic example of a sophisticated undercover operation involves an 
officer using a cover identity to infiltrate a criminal network,192 but that is 
hardly the only example.  In “stash-house stings,” undercover officers recruit 
suspects to help them rob non-existent drug dealers, which requires them to 
create a fake stash house (where the arrest will ultimately take place).193  Some 
undercover operations can be even more sophisticated.  In late 2013, for 
example, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
was rocked by the public disclosure of a series of sting operations in which 
ATF agents operated fake pawn shops or other private businesses that 
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AMERICA’S MOST VIOLENT OUTLAW MOTORCYCLE GANG (2005). 
193 Brad Heath, ATF Uses Fake Drugs, Big Bucks to Snare Suspects, USA TODAY, June 28, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/27/ 
atf-stash-houses-sting-usa-today-investigation/2457109. 
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conducted illegal transactions (such as purchasing illegal firearms and stolen 
goods) so as to eventually arrest their “customers.”194  
Beyond plainclothes and undercover operations, the use of informants is 
another common investigative practice that can blur the line between public 
and private policing. 195  Informants can be passive, in the sense that they pass 
along information to the police but play no other role in the investigation, but 
it is active informants, who engage in information gathering or participate in 
operations at the explicit direction of officers, who raise the specter of private 
policing.  Informants can set law enforcement priorities,196 work to attract 
would-be wrong-doers,197 and facilitate prolonged investigations.198 
Like certain investigative techniques, the way in which police acquire and 
deploy surveillance or investigative equipment can blur the blue line, 
particularly in the modern era of stretched public budgets.  As part of its 2006 
downtown, urban revitalization efforts, for example, the Minneapolis Police 
Department partnered with the Target Corporation to install security 
cameras.199  The number grew from the original 30 to over 100 cameras 
deployed in the 40-block area, monitored by both private security personnel 
and the city police department.200  In 2012, Target Corporation’s Vice 
President of Assets Protection estimated that Target has partnered with about 
two dozen cities to provide similar access to security cameras.  Target is far 
from alone.  A range of private businesses in metropolitan Grand Rapids, for 
example, allow public police agencies to access and monitor their security 
video feeds in real time.201  In Minneapolis, the SafeZone Collaborative 
formed a 501(c)(3) organization, then successfully lobbied for the 
metropolitan area to be zoned as a Downtown Improvement District (a type 
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of Business Improvement District202), where a special tax on property owners 
funds continued security efforts.203   
Public officers have come to rely on private actors for everyday police 
operations.  Private police support services—such as private companies that 
provide call-taking and dispatch services204 or private forensic laboratories 
that contract with police agencies205—are common, but so, too, is private 
entanglement in what would otherwise appear to be public police 
investigations.  Before it merged with the Insurance Crime Prevention 
Institute, for example, the National Automobile Theft Bureau—a private, not-
for-profit organization supported by the private insurance industry—managed 
databases that collected information about stolen vehicles.206  In many states, 
law enforcement officers were required to report information about motor 
vehicle thefts to the Bureau, including details about the vehicle and the theft 
itself.207  A more contemporary and mundane example of officer reliance on 
private actors may be found in the context of DUI enforcement.  According 
to the most recent Uniform Crime Reporting data, more than 1 million persons 
were arrested for driving under the influence in 2015.208  Some number of 
those arrestees were subjected to a blood draw, initiated by officers to obtain 
the suspects’ blood-alcohol levels.  In 2016, the Supreme Court held that 
warrantless blood-testing for DUI purposes violated the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable searches absent exigent circumstances or, 
presumably, the suspect’s consent.209  Regardless of whether a blood sample 
is taken pursuant to a warrant, exigency, or consent, it is typically not an 
officer who draws blood.  Although precise data are unavailable, it seems safe 
to say that task is typically left to a medical professional;210 indeed, state law 
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may impose such a limitation.211  In short, in the context of blood samples, 
officers’ investigative efforts are heavily dependent on the cooperation of 
private actors.212  In some jurisdictions, “cooperation” is misleading; the 
assistance of medical professionals is so essential that state law may require 
medical authorities to assist police investigations by performing blood draws 
upon an officer’s request when the suspect consents or when the state’s 
implied-consent rule is implicated.213 
IV.  POLICE REFORM & THE BLURRED BLUE LINE 
The prior two Parts illustrate how the popular conception of policing as 
an exclusively or primarily governmental activity is wrong as both a historical 
and contemporary matter, demonstrating that the Thin Blue Line is neither as 
thin nor as blue as it first appears.  This Part explores the implications of that 
observation in the context of police reform.  Calls for police reform are 
nothing new; indeed, criticism of modern policing predates policing itself.214  
Over at least the last 85 years, a legion of public commissions have studied 
policing at either a national or local level and used their findings to make 
reform recommendations, from the Wickersham Commission’s 1931 Report 
on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, which addressed issues with Prohibition 
enforcement, to President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 
which released its final report in 2015.215  Private organizations and nonprofits 
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have done the same,216 as have academics and other commentators217  Since 
the shooting death of Michael Brown by Ferguson, Missouri, Police Officer 
Darren Wilson in the summer of 2014 and the national emergence of the 
#BlackLivesMatter movement,218 there has been an unprecedented consensus 
among community members, commentators, politicians, and police 
executives that reform of some type is necessary.219  
The relevance of the blurred blue line to police reform efforts depends on 
one’s perspective on reform and the emphasis one puts on different types of 
reform.220  One plausible position, for example, is that the conflation of public 
and private policing as it is described in this Article has no conceptual or 
practical implications for police reform.  Such conflation lacks conceptual 
salience to the extent that one’s interest in reform is limited to a particular 
category of actions—the infringement of individual privacy, liberty, and 
autonomy—only when those actions are performed by a particular entity—
government agents.  In that case, it may be argued, the dual observations that 
both governmental and non-governmental actors perform the same invasive 
actions and that they both also engage in behaviors that are not invasive may 
be irrelevant.  And even if there were conceptual implications, one might 
reject the implications of the blurred blue line on practical grounds.  Police 
reform, the argument goes, can be a distressingly slow and uneven process 
when it is limited to public police agencies; attempts to broaden the way we 
look at policing could further limit both the scope and pace of reform. 
Those positions, and others of the same vein, are not without some merit, 
but they miss the point.  My argument is neither that the distinctions between 
public and private policing should be ignored for purposes of reform nor that 
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both should be targeted for reform.  Instead, my point is that a more holistic 
understanding of what policing is can better inform conversations about what 
policing should be.  Even divorced from any particular policy preference, the 
blurred blue line is a relevant consideration for anyone interested in police 
reform.  In every incarnation, reform efforts are directed at changing the 
nature of the police community/relationship, using a combination of 
incentives and disincentives to change officer behavior.  A broader 
recognition of public and private policing, after all, can inform both the goals 
and mechanisms, the ends and the means, of police reform.  In the following 
sections, I explain how a broader conception of policing, one that appreciates 
the blurred blue line, may affect the way reformers approach information 
gathering, the distribution of police resources, and the regulation of policing. 
A. Information Gathering 
Expanding the conventional understanding of policing to include at least 
some aspects of both public and private policing offers a potentially rich 
source of new information. There are, of course, meaningful differences that 
should lead us to be wary of casual comparisons.  In the context of private 
security, Elizabeth Joh has persuasively argued that there are at least five 
dimensions of variation (goals, resources, legal powers, jurisdiction, and 
organizational location) and four distinct types of private policing (protective 
policing, intelligence policing, publicly contracted policing, and corporate 
policing) that make it a mistake to view private policing as a monolithic 
entity.221  In the same vein, it would be a mistake to conflate public and private 
policing by citing to similarities without appreciating the dimensions of 
variation and distinct types of policing being performed.  Accounting for 
those distinctions, however, may provide valuable information about how the 
various types of policing are performed differently given not just the 
variations that Joh identified, but also sharp distinctions in training, 
equipment, staffing, and agency principles.  Those differences, once 
identified, can be scoured for lessons that may be applicable across the blurred 
blue line.   
Recall, for example, that registered or licensed security guards in South 
Carolina who are “hired or employed to provide security services on a specific 
property [are] granted the authority and arrest power given to sheriff’s 
deputies” while on that property. 222  Whether and how those private security 
services differ in practice from geographic security services provided by 
government entities, such as court security officers and county sheriff’s 
deputies, can inform a range of policy decisions about who should secure 
government properties and, by going beyond the limited consideration of cost, 
how they should do so.  The same thing is true with the private security patrol 
function; a superficial acknowledgement that it exists could be deepened to a 
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more robust understanding about how it compares to public police patrol not 
just in terms of cost, which is the most common consideration,223 but also in 
terms of legitimacy and effectiveness given the different aspects of the police 
function: law enforcement, order maintenance, and service provision.  That, 
in turn, could lead to a more informed policy decision to discourage or 
promote greater integration of public and private policing.224  These issues 
have been formally addressed internationally, but have received scant 
attention in the United States. 
There is, perhaps, little public interest in the static security or private 
patrol function themselves, but it is also true that the blurred blue line can be 
a source of information about the more controversial issues of police 
practices, including the use of force.  It is often said that the state holds a 
monopoly on violence.  It would be more accurate to say that the state holds 
a monopoly on legitimizing violence; government determines whether the use 
of force is permissible ex ante, primarily through the legislative process, and 
ex post, primarily through the executive (law enforcement) and judicial 
(adjudication) processes.  Although a number of studies have sought to 
identify factors that correlate with police violence,225 it remains true that there 
is a startling lack of reliable national or regional data about police uses of 
force.226  A number of voices have called for more robust data-gathering 
efforts, including some voices within the federal government itself,227 and it 
may well be that case that expanding the dataset by including the use of force 
by private police may provide valuable insights.  If a comparative review 
finds that there is a discrepancy in public and private police use force, which 
seems likely, thorough analysis can determine whether that discrepancy is 
solely attributable to the different functions that public and private officers 
fulfill, whether other factors—training, equipment, culture, organizational 
structure, the distinct legal standards that apply, and so on—affect how force 
is used.  Further, analysis may help identify the role of force in advancing a 
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particular function.  To the extent that the public and private policing share 
the same goals, for example, one might study how the different rates of force 
relate to relative effectiveness in deterring crime or building public trust. 
B. The Distribution of Police Resources 
In addition to providing information about practices that may translate 
between private and public policing, the blurred blue line can be a source of 
information about the distribution of police resources and the nature of 
policing in different contexts.  Policing is widely viewed as redistributive; the 
communities that provide the lion’s share of the tax revenue that funds public 
policing efforts are typically not where the majority of policing takes place.  
Or, to provide a more nuanced view, those communities may receive a 
different mix of policing services than poorer communities; more community 
policing and problem-oriented policing, for example, and less enforcement 
oriented or zero-tolerance policing.  Expanding the conception of policing to 
include private policing efforts, however, may change our understanding: the 
distribution of police resources may be less uneven while, at the same time, 
the nature of police activities may be even more lopsided.  Returning to the 
debate about police uses of force, for example, the fact that black people are 
affected disproportionately is often explained, at least in part, by the fact that 
officers have more of a presence in the lower-income, higher-crime minority 
communities.  This may well be the case if we define “officers” as public 
officers working their regular duty assignments.  But if we take into account 
private policing efforts, the picture may change – defining police more 
broadly, we may find that there is a heavier police presence in high-income 
communities than was previously appreciated.  If that’s true, a racial 
discrepancy in the use of force may have less to do with police presence and 
officer-civilian interactions and more to do with the nature of policing and 
the quality of those interactions.  So much seems intuitive—officers are, after 
all, far more likely to use force when making an arrest than during the course 
of a interaction unrelated to an enforcement action—but accounting for the 
full scope of policing activities will provide substantially more precision than 
current data permits. 
Even outside the use-of-force context, efforts to accurately chart the 
distribution of police resources may fall short if they do not take the blurred 
blue line into account.  These accounts are important, and not just for 
traditional crime control reasons.  Economic modeling suggests that the 
allocation of police resources can influence crime, of course, but it can also 
affect housing prices, aggregate welfare, income inequality, and 
integration.228  If correct, those observations have important policy 
implications.  “[S]ocieties with high levels of income inequality may face a 
complicated dilemma. Concentrated [police] protection may maximize 
aggregate welfare but exacerbate social disparities. In contrast, in more 
equalitarian societies, dispersed protection simultaneously maximizes 
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aggregate welfare and reduces social disparities.”229  But exploring the 
relationship between current practice and its policy implications assumes that 
current practice—the allocation of protective services—is easy identifiable.  
David Thacher, for example, has compared geographic measurements of 
income inequality against the number of publicly employed police employees 
per crime committed in that geographic area to find that “[p]olice protection 
has become more concentrated in the most advantaged communities—those 
with the highest per-capita incomes and the largest share of white 
residents.”230  Even relatively sophisticated measures may provide a 
misleading picture if they fail to account for the blurred blue line.  
Contemporary accounts may be under-inclusive if they omit private policing 
efforts, and they may be over-inclusive if they assume that public policing 
efforts have a consistently public orientation. 
In a less academic vein, the allocation of police resources has traditionally 
been primarily concerned with police patrol.231  That is, there has historically 
been a heavy emphasis on making sure that there was sufficient coverage, 
which is often defined by referring to the number of officers that cover a 
geographic area given the number and nature of calls for service.232  Agencies 
make allocations based on the estimated number of on-duty officers, but while 
traditional methods account for factors like officers who are out sick or on 
vacation, they do not directly take into account factors like private policing 
efforts or officer moonlighting (that is, off-duty officers who are working in 
a police capacity for private employers).  Incongruously, agencies that justify 
moonlighting policies by referring to the ameliorative effect of having off-
duty officers handle calls for service may not take those effects into account 
when designing their patrol systems.  A more comprehensive understanding 
of policing resources may provide benefits to the allocation of on-duty 
resources. 
C. The Regulation of Policing 
Understanding the blurred blue line may also prove to be an important 
consideration in how society regulates the practice of policing.  Effective 
regulation requires an accurate understanding of the regulated activity.  As I 
have written elsewhere in the context of constitutional regulation,233 factual 
misunderstandings about the police environment, police practices, and officer 
motivations can result in a misalignment between the legal or administrative 
regulation and the world that regulation was intended to effect.  That 
misalignment, in turn, can result in the over- or under-regulation of policing, 
which is to say the over- or under-protection of rights.  A similar observation 
may apply in the context of public and private policing: an incomplete 
understanding of policing can lead to regulation that is focused exclusively 
                                                 
229 Id. at 4. 
230 David Thacher, The Distribution of Police Protection, 27 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 275 
(2011). 
231 See, e.g., FRITSCH ET AL., supra note 102. 
232 Id. 
233 Stoughton, supra note 102. 
2017] The Blurred Blue Line  151 
on policing as it is conducted by public officials not because the regulatory 
decision was driven by informed consideration of the options but instead 
because the blurred blue line was not considered at all.  In this section, I 
discuss two possible ways that a broader conception of policing might affect 
constitutional and sub-constitutional regulation. 
The Fourth Amendment limits the government’s ability to infringe on 
civilians by requiring that such invasions be “reasonable.”234  This restriction 
has given rise to what has been described as a “mess”235 of 
“embarrass[ing]”236 rules that seek to guide courts as they answer two 
interrelated questions: whether the government engaged in a search at all and, 
if so, whether that search was reasonable.  With regard to the first part of that 
inquiry, the Supreme Court has developed the third-party doctrine, which 
obviates Fourth Amendment protections for information that has been 
knowingly revealed to a third party.  The doctrine flows from the propositions 
that the Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy and 
that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information that they share. 237  The third-party doctrine is deeply 
controversial among legal scholars and civil rights advocates.  It is “the Fourth 
Amendment rule scholars love to hate[,] the Lochner of search and seizure 
law, widely criticized as profoundly misguided.”238  Many, though not all, of 
the criticisms arise from the observation that an individual can share 
something and still expect it to be private and the intuition that such an 
expectation ought to be honored.  Consider, for example, the criticism of the 
Court’s decision in United States v. Miller, which held that bank records—
checks, deposit clips, and the like—were not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment in part because the information was “voluntarily conveyed to the 
banks and exposed to their employees.”239  In his highly influential search & 
seizure treatise, Wayne LaFave criticized that decision, quoting a California 
state court opinion that read, “It cannot be gainsaid that the customer of a bank 
expects that the documents, such as checks, which he transmits to the bank in 
the course of his business operations will remain private.”240  As Criminal 
Procedure students know, criticisms of that nature are grounded in the 
observation that, in many contexts, our social norms rely on other people not 
looking at, not remembering, or not analyzing information that we display to 
them.  We expect that, in most cases, people will use any information we give 
them for the limited purpose that we gave it to them.  But not the police.  
Officers look at us differently.  A number of objections to the third-party 
doctrine reflect discomfort with the idea of ignoring broad social norms about 
the communication of information.  
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The blurred blue line both complicates the picture and offers a principled 
way to think about the third-party doctrine in non-absolute terms.  Critics who 
advocate for the eradication of the third-party doctrine because it does not 
incorporate our behavioral norms and supporters who advocate for its 
continued application because it has some value even though it cuts against 
social expectations may both have an incomplete picture in mind.  In some 
contexts, we casually expose information with the expectation that it will 
remain private.  But in other contexts a reasonable person should know that 
the information they disclose is likely to be subjected to more than casual 
review, even if such review isn’t by the police.  The blurred blue line can help 
draw that line; sometimes it’s reasonable to expect that a private party will 
look at information in the same way that a public police officer would.  A 
more holistic view of policing might lead one to the position that the knowing 
exposure of information that a reasonable person could expect to be subjected 
to police-like scrutiny obviates the expectation of privacy, but a knowing 
exposure of information to a private party who is not reasonably expected to 
analyze that information in a police-like way does not.  Applying the third-
party doctrine through the filter of the blurred blue line might lead to a rule 
that bank records lack Fourth Amendment protection (to the extent they may 
be subject to internal audit by bank personnel) but call records remain 
protected because no one at the phone company is likely to subject them to 
critical analysis.  There are, no doubt, a host of considerations that my hastily 
sketched out approach fails to take into account.  My point here is not that 
limiting the third-party doctrine is normatively better than leaving it 
unchanged, eliminating it, or modifying it in some other way.  Instead, my 
point is only that the blurred blue line offers a perspective that is largely 
missing from existing conversations about the constitutional regulation of 
policing. 
A full appreciation for the blurred blue line may also provoke new 
conversations about the sub-constitutional regulation of policing, including 
what I describe here as semi-public private policing and semi-private public 
policing.  As discussed above, I surveyed several hundred police agencies that 
collectively employ almost 20% of the non-federal officers in the country 
about moonlighting, the practice of permitting off-duty officers to work in a 
police capacity for private employers.241  I found substantial variety in the 
way the practice is regulated by state law and administrative policies.242  For 
example, under California law, the public agency that employs the officer 
bears “‘any and all civil and criminal liability’ arising from an off-duty 
officer’s actions, even those taken on behalf of a private employer.”243  
Mississippi, in contrast, makes the private employer liable for an off-duty 
officer’s actions and omissions; the state and state subdivisions are explicitly 
exempted.244  Given the frequency and importance of police moonlighting, 
this area is overdue for serious policy discussions. 
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The same may be said for private efforts that support public policing.  
Increasingly, traditional police agencies are relying on private entities to not 
only gather massive quantities of information, but also to analyze that 
information.  For police agencies, the goal is actionable intelligence; private 
vendors can provide information that agencies can readily act upon.  
Summaries of Federal Bureau of Investigation memoranda filed in United 
States v. Rettenmaier, for example, reflected that the FBI used the Geek 
Squad, Best Buy’s computer repair service, as a “tripwire” to detect child 
pornography on customers’ computers.245  The Bureau maintained what was 
described as a “close liaison with the Geek Squad management in an effort to 
glean case initiations and to support the division's Computer Intrusion and 
Cyber Crime programs.”  Geek Squad technicians were reportedly paid as 
confidential informants, receiving a bounty each time they found 
incriminating evidence. 
Private actors do more than gather and sift through data; governmental 
agencies also rely on them to provide insight into how to use the information 
that has been collected and assessed.  Police agencies and political 
subdivisions rely on private analysis to identify a range of problems and to 
develop operational solutions.  For example, Palantir Law Enforcement, a 
division of a California-based company named for the magical seeing stones 
in the Lord of the Rings, advertises in its marketing materials that it “provides 
the LAPD with a full suite of analytical capabilities, including geospatial 
search, trend analysis, link charts, timelines, and histograms.”246  It does so 
by reviewing data from multiple databases and making connections that might 
otherwise elude investigators.  As a result, the investigative response is 
predicated on the results of third-party analysis: it is the private entity that 
identifies whom investigators should speak to, how to infiltrate criminal 
organizations, and so on.247  Further, police agencies, like law schools or other 
institutions of higher education, may hire strategic consultants to review 
practices or other data and made a range of recommendations about training, 
operations, community engagement, and so on.  The Baltimore Police 
Department, for example, spent more than a quarter million dollars on a 
“police department consulting service contract” to develop “a strategic plan 
with goals and objectives for three and five years.”248 
Adopting a broad conception of policing may mean more robust 
regulation at three different points: the collection of data, the analysis of that 
data, and the response to that analysis.  It does not appear, however, that the 
Constitution has sufficient regulatory reach.  The constitution regulates 
                                                 
245Scott Moxley, FBI Used Best Buy's Geek Squad to Increase Secret Public Surveillance, OC 
WEEKLY, Mar. 8, 2017, http://www.ocweekly.com/news/fbi-used-best-buys-geek-squad-to-increase-
secret-public-surveillance-7950030. 
246  Responding to Crime in Real Time, PALANTIR, http://www.palantir.com/wp-assets/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/Impact-Study-LAPD.pdf. 
247Shane Harris, Palantir Technologies Spots Patterns to Solve Crimes and Track Terrorists, WIRED, 
July 31, 2012, http://www.wired.co.uk/article/joining-the-dots. 
248  Mark Reutter, Meet Baltimore's $560-an-hour Cop Consultant, BALT. BREW, Apr. 24, 2013, 
https://baltimorebrew.com/2013/04/24/meet-baltimores-560-an-hour-cop-consultant/. 
154 AM. J. CRIM. L.  [Vol. 44:2 
private actors who engage in state action,249 but that happens most clearly 
when a governmental agent explicitly directs the private actor’s course of 
action.  Sub-constitutional regulation may be necessary when the private actor 
is simply selling information—which was not gathered explicitly or 
exclusively for government purposes—to a public police agency.  In the world 
of meta-data and large-scale analytics of consumer information, the blurred 
blue line serves as a reminder of the potential need to regulate information 
and information services that are sold or provided to the police, especially 
when the police are one of several potential buyers. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Modern policing is conceived of as the Thin Blue Line, a wall of police 
officers who are all that stands between ordered, civilized society and the 
anarchic, criminal element that constantly threatens it.  But as evocative as 
that dramatic imagery is, it inaccurately suggests that public officers are the 
exclusive provider of policing services.  That has never been the case.  
Building on existing literature, this article explored the historical and 
contemporary overlaps between public and private policing, demonstrating 
that the Thin Blue Line is neither as thin nor as blue as it first appears.  To 
identify the nature of those overlaps, this article described four different 
phenomena: private policing; semi-public private policing; semi-private, 
public policing; and public policing.  Each category abounds with everyday 
behaviors that blur the line between public and private policing.  From private 
security guards initiating traffic stops in gated neighborhoods and patrolling 
government buildings to privately created police forces, from off-duty police 
officers working in uniform for private employers to the use of plainclothes 
officers and police informants, modern policing efforts are best described as 
“the blurred blue line.”  The fact that such efforts are utterly ordinary only 
strengthens the argument that the popular conception of policing requires 
revision: the blurred blue line is not some exceptional aspect of contemporary 
policing, it is contemporary policing. 
This article explored some of the ways in which a broader conception of 
policing, one that takes into account the blurred blue line, might affect the 
process of police reform.  A more holistic understanding of what policing is 
can better inform conversations about what policing should be.  In every 
incarnation, reform efforts are directed at changing the nature of the police 
community/relationship through a combination of incentives and 
disincentives to change officer behavior and police culture.  A broader 
recognition of public and private policing can inform both the goals and 
mechanisms, the ends and the means, of police reform.  It can do so in at least 
three ways.  First, expanding the conventional understanding of policing to 
include at least some aspects of both public and private policing offers a 
potentially rich source of new information about how policing is performed 
and the extent to which policing efforts may be considered successful.   
                                                 
249 See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001); Lugar 
v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
2017] The Blurred Blue Line  155 
Second, a greater appreciation for the blurred blue line may lead us to 
rethink the distribution of police resources in society.  Consider that racially 
disparate aspects of policing—including stops, arrests, and uses of force—are 
often related to the relatively heavy police presence in poor, minority 
communities.  In short, the story goes, police just go where the crime is.  That 
may be true of public officers, but if we take into account private policing 
efforts, the picture may change – defining police more broadly, we find that 
there is a far heavier police presence in high-income communities than was 
previously appreciated.  That suggests that the racial discrepancy in police 
activities may have less to do with police presence and the number of officer-
civilian interactions and more to do with the nature of policing and the quality 
of those interactions.  Taken seriously, the blurred line between public and 
private policing may lead us to reconsider systemic problems, their 
underlying causes, and promising solutions. 
Third and finally, understanding the blurred blue line may also prove to 
be an important consideration in how society regulates the practice of 
policing.  Effective regulation requires an accurate understanding of the 
regulated activity; an incomplete understanding of policing can lead to 
regulation that is focused exclusively on policing as it is conducted by public 
officials not because the regulatory decision was driven by informed 
consideration of how policing should be defined but instead because the 
blurred blue line was not considered at all.  From constitutional conundrums 
such as the third-party doctrine to state workers compensation liability, the 
blurred blue line brings into sharp focus a range of regulatory considerations 
that are customarily overlooked. 
This Article intentionally does not provide a normative determination 
about the blurred blue line.  My goal was not to establish that it is good or 
bad; my goal was instead to establish that it is.  Going beyond the 
conventional understanding of policing will not simplify the process of police 
reform.  If anything, a more robust appreciation of the blurred blue line will 
complicate something that is already complex.  Yet this additional complexity 
is necessary to fully understand policing so that lasting reform becomes 
possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
